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THE APEX DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON THE

APPLICATION oF THE SHERMAN AcT To AcTIVITIEs OF LABOR UNIONS

-Labor made a bold attempt in the case of Apex Hosiery Company v.
Leader 1 to procure a determination by the Supreme Court that labor
organizations and their activities are exempt from the Sherman Act. 2
The act, having survived this attack, presumably remains a potential
weapon against labor unions. 3 However, the Court by its decision has
rejected a theory that the Sherman Act should be expanded on the
principles of the Wagner Act decisions, 4 has imposed a new restriction
upon its application, and has opened the way for developments which
will have substantially the effect of excluding labor unions from its
application.

1 310 U. S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940), noted 54 HARV. L. REv. 146 (1940).
The respondent labor union had engaged in a sit-down strike in petitioner's plant to
enforce its demands for a closed shop agreement. Petitioner, which produced $5,000,000
worth of hosiery annually, about 3 % of the total output of the industry, shipped interstate So% of its product. As a result of the occupation of the plant and destruction
of machinery by the strikers, petitioner's operations were completely halted for more
than three months. In the trial court petitioner recovered a judgment for triple
damages of $700,000.
2 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S. C. (1934), § I et seq.
8 To have excluded labor unions from the operation of the Sherman Act, on the
theory that Congress had not intended the statute to apply to such combinations, would
have me<1nt overruling decisions which went back thirty-two years. This the Court
was unwilling to do in view of the failure of repeated attempts to accomplish that
result through Congressional action. Apex case, 310 U. S. 469 at 488. The case for
labor is set out in Bou~in, "The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes," 39 CoL. L. REv.
1283 (1939) and 40 CoL. L. REv. 14 (1940).
4 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
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I.

Whether activities of a labor union constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act has in part depended upon the stage of interstate commerce at which the restraint is imposed/ Cases of union interference
with the movement of interstate commerce can be classified as follows:
(I) preventing production of goods at their source, ( 2) preventing
movement of goods between source and market, (3) preventing purchase or use of goods at the market end. The Coronado cases 6 established the doctrine that activities in the first category, as contrasted
with those in the third, do not constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act without evidence of a union purpose having interstate ramifications
from which an intent to restrain commerce could be inferred.
While there was proof in the Apex case that production of goods
to be shipped to markets in other states had been prevented by flagrantly unlawful methods, there was no evidence that the union had
any purpose except to increase its strength within the city of Philadelphia. Thus, on authority of the Coronado decisions, the Sherman
Act was not applicable. 7 This impasse for the petitioners was met by
the ingenious argument that the Wagner Act decisions were authority
for applying the Sherman Act to interferences with production of goods
to be sold in interstate markets, since those decisions determined that
stoppage of manufacturing directly burdens and restrains commerce/
The Court conceded that the activities of the respondent union were
within the scope of federal power, but denied that the operation of
the Sherman Act extended to all unlawful labor activities which obstruct
57 S. Ct. 615 (1936); National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 S. Ct. 615, 630, 645 (1936).
s Cases in which the Sherman Act has been applied to labor activities have been
traditionally classified as cases where the interference with commerce was direct so that
intent to restrain commerce could be inferred and cases where the interference was
indirect but accompanied by an express intent to restrain commerce. 49 YALE L. J.
5 I 8 at 519 ( 1940). Whether an interference is "direct" or "indirect," however, has
depended upon the stage of commerce at which the interference is imposed.
6 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570
(1922); Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551
(1925).
Gregory, "Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act-The Apex Case,"
CHI. L. REv. 347 at 353 (1940).
8 Apex case, 310 U.S. 469 at 474 ff. Petitioner reasoned as follows: the Sherman
Act applies to restraints which directly burden interstate commerce; the Supreme Court
in order to sustain the constitutionality of the Wagner Act necessarily had to determine
that restraints on production, which that statute was attempting to eliminate, directly
burdened interstate commerce so as to be within the scope of the commerce power;
ergo, restraints on production were within the Sherman Act. The argument is discussed
in 49 YALE L. J. 518 at 524 ff. (1940).
1

7 UNiv.
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the flow of commerce. 0 Yet the impression to be gained from previous
decisions is that the Court has been applying the act, except where restrained by notions of the breadth of the commerce power, to any
interference with interstate sales of goods. Limitations in applying the
act to labor activities, instead of coming from a studied interpretation
of statutory language and purpose, were the product of inhibitions derived from a restricted conception of federal power.10
The first instance of restricting the scope of the statute where labor
union activities were involved was the First Coronado case.11 Respecting the power of Congress over matters which, though not strictly interstate commerce, burden such commerce, the Court there said:
"it has the power to punish conspiracies in which such practices are
part of the plan, to hinder, restrain or monopolize interstate commerce. But in the latter case, the intent to injure, obstruct or
restrain interstate commerce must appear as an obvious consequence
of what is to be done, or be shown by direct evidence or other
circumstances." 12
Distinguishing Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbitry Hatters case),18 the first
Supreme Court case holding labor activities within the Sherman Act,
the Court said: "The direct object of attack was interstate commerce."14 Then at the close of the decision the Court significantly
stated: "The circumstances are such as to awaken regret that, in our
view of the federal jurisdiction, we can not affirm the judgment. But
9 Apex

case, 3 IO U. S. 469 at 484 ff.
The Sherman Act decisions do not accurately measure the scope of the commerce power. See 35 CoL. L. REV. 1072 (1935). Still the Court in instances where it
has restricted the application of the Sherman Act in labor cases was motivated by a
reluctance to extend the arm of the federal government too far. Any other view hardly
explains the absence of correlation between what constitutes a violation of the act and
how commerce and competition are affected. In a note, 39 CoL. L. REv. 1247 (1939),
criticizing the holding of the district court in the Apex case, issue is taken with the
view that the req_uirement of an intentional restraint was derived not from the statute
but from interpretation of constitutional power. Yet the reasons why intent is readily
inferred in one case and not in another are unexplained. The writer of the comment
in 49 YALE L. J. 518 (1940) suggests that the varying results in labor cases under
the Sherman Act reflect the Court's attitude toward the merits of the different union
activities. But the analysis does not satisfactorily explain the consistent distinction
between strike cases and boycott cases despite the lack of difference in the union
objectives or in the illegality of the union methods.
11
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570
10

(1922).
12
Id., 259 U. S. 344 at 408.
18
208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301 (1908).
14

United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 at 409, 42 S. Ct.

570 (1922).
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it is of far higher importance that we should preserve inviolate the
fundamental limitations in respect to the federal jurisdiction." 15
In the next case 16 involving union interference with production of
goods to be shipped interstate, the Court said:
"This review of the cases makes it clear that the mere reduction
in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate commerce, by
the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture, is ordinarily
an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. It is only
when the intent or necessary effect upon such commerce in the
article is to enable those preventing the manufacture to monopolize
the supply, control its price or discriminate as between its would-be
purchasers, that the unlawful interference with its manufacture
can be said directly to burden interstate commerce." 17
The language sounds distinctly as though the Court were thinking in
terms of federal power with no regard to the purposes of the statute.18
The same approach appears in Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin 19
where the bases of the decision were the absence of an intent to affect
"the sale or transit of materials in interstate commerce" in view of the
local purposes of the union, and the fact that curtailment of the shipment of goods in interstate commerce was a result "incidental, indirect,
and remote."
Despite these indications that the previous decisions were worked
out in terms of constitutional power, the Court in the Apex case read
into them a construction of the statute limiting its application to restraints upon commerce which were intended to have, or in fact did
have, the effect of suppressing competition in the interstate market. 20
Even the decisions in which labor activities were held to be within the
statute do not support such a construction, for they likewise indicate
15

Id., 259 U. S. 344 at 413 (italics supplied).
United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457, 44
S. Ct. 623 (1924-).
17
Id., 265 U. S. 457 at 471 (italics supplied).
18
See cases where the Court has tested the validity of legislation under the commerce power by the directness of the relation between the regulated activities and the
movement of interstate commerce, for example: Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42
S. Ct. 397 (1922); Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 S. Ct.
470 (1923); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837
(1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936). In the
Schechter case, 295 U. S. 495 at 547, the Court found in the labor cases under the
Sherman Act support for its approach in passing upon the validity of the National
Recovery Act, saying, "The distinction between direct and indirect effects has been
clearly recognized in the application of the Anti-Trust Act."
19
289 U.S. 103, 53 S. Ct. 549 (1933).
20
Apex case, 3 IO U. S. 469 at 509 ff.
16
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that the Court has been thinking in terms of effect on the movement
of interstate commerce and not in terms of effect on competition. The
language of the statute was construed in the Danbury Hatters case as
prohibiting "any combination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a trader to engage in business." 21
In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, the sole emphasis was upon
the loss of the plaintiff's interstate trade; the majority of the Court
did not even mention that defendants undertook to unionize the plaintiff at the instance of the latter's competitors. 22 The Second Coronado
decision seems to treat the union purpose of preventing competition with
union-mined coal in other states merely as evidence necessary to relate
the union activities more closely to the movement of goods in interstate commerce.23
The effect of these decisions has been that under the Sherman Act
restraints imposed at one stage of commerce were treated differently
than restraints imposed at another stage. 24 Whereas the showing of a
purpose to curtail the quantity of commerce in interstate markets was
essential to bring within the act a conspiracy to stop production, no
such showing was required in the case of a conspiracy to conduct a boycott. Apparent approval then by the Court in the Apex case of the
decisions giving rise to this distinction confuses the meaning of its
theory that the Sherman Act, on the basis of its language and purpose,
has a restricted application. 25 If the act is aimed at the evils of suppressing competition, it is difficult to see why preventing production of
21 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 at 293, 28 S. Ct. 301 (1908) (italics
supplied).
22 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921). These facts are brought out in the dissenting opinion, 254 U. S. 443 at 479 .ff. A later case, following the authority of the
Duplex case, is Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S.
37, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).
.
28 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 at 305, 310, 45
S. Ct. 551 (1925).
24 Compare the boycott cases, Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301
(1908), and Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172
(1921), with the strike cases, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S.
344, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922), and United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk
Co., 265 U.S. 457, 44 S. Ct. 623 (1924).
25 "Labor under the Apex Decision," 8 INT. JuR. AsSN. BULL: 125 at 136
( I 940) : "Obviously, in terms of the Court's own primary ground for decision, the
central point is-what usable tests are provided to determine whether in a particular
case labor's influence upon the market amounts to a suppression or curtailment of commercial competition? In all candor, the majority's assertion that the Duplex, Bedford
and Second Coronado Coal cases satisfied the need to show such suppression or curtailment of commercial competition may conceivably emasculate this whole aspect of
the Apex decision."
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goods at their source is not just as much a violation as preventing purchase or use at the market end.26
2.

Not only was interference with production involved in the Apex
case but there was also an interference of the intermediate type, namely,
preventing shipment of completed goods to fill orders of dealers in
other states. 21 The majority opinion held that even the latter activity
was no violation of the Sherman Act, stated that the statute was not
aimed at policing interstate transportation, and distinguished other
decisions. 28 Overlooked was the very wording of the injunction in the
Duplex case, which enjoined "interfering or attempting to interfere
with the sale, transportation, or delivery in interstate commerce" of
the plaintiff's products. 29 Moreover, three justices in an opinion written
by Chief Justice Hughes dissented from the conclusion that a conspiracy
to prevent transportation in interstate commerce was outside the act,
relying upon lower court decisions and expressions in the Supreme
Court opinions.so
Though the dissent may be fully justified on the basis of authority,
the holding is at least consistent with the theory of the majority that
the statute is to have a restricted interpretation. Obstructions imposed at
any of the three stages of interstate commerce curtail the quantity of
goods moving in commerce and so reduce competition in those goods;
and an obstruction at one stage can curtail the quantity of commerce as
effectively as one at another stage. Therefore, since the Court in the
26 Competition in interstate markets between members of an industry is reduced
whenever the business of one is subjected to a burden not imposed on the business of
the others. Restriction on the manufacture of its products is certainly as fatal to the
competitive powers of a business as resistance to the sale of its products.
27 Apex case, 3 IO U. S. 469 at 483.
28 Id., 310 U. S. 469 at 490, 5 l 2.
29 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 at 478, 41 S. Ct. 172

(1921).
so Apex case, 3 IO U. S. 469 at 514-5 l 5: "Whatever vistas of new uncertainties in
the application of the Sherman Act the present decision may open, it seems to be definitely determined that a conspiracy of workers, or for that matter of others, to obstruct
or prevent the shipment or delivery of goods in interstate commerce to fill orders of
the customers of a manufacturer or dealer is not a violation of the Sherman Act. With
that conclusion I cannot agree." The dissent confines itself to union activities of the
second category, nowhere advocating that a conspiracy to prevent the manufacture of
goods comes within the act. However, as revealed by the record in the case, only a
small percentage of the damages proved by petitioners could possibly have been
attributable to the interference with the shipment of finished products. Undoubtedly
recovery can be had only for damages proximately resulting from a violation of the act,
and so, even had the contention of the dissent prevailed, the benefit to petitioner
would have been slight.
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Apex case decided that interference of the :µrst category lies outside
the scope of the statute, it could not rationally decide that the second
device, other factors being the same, is within its scope. Even the dissenting judges did not argue that interference with production of goods,
as in the Apex case, should be within the scope of the act; hence they
retained an arbitrary distinction between interference with commerce at
different stages. This distinction, which had grown into the law when
the Court apparently felt restrained in its application of the statute to
labor cases by the limits of federal power, is explainable as marking a
line which fits the statute into those limits.31 Now that the limits exist
no longer, the rationale is knocked out from under the distinction.
Consequently the Court faced the altemative of extending the act to
coincide with the widened interpretation of the commerce clause, or of
reconsidering the act with a view to restricting its application along
new lines. The dissent did neither; the majority, by refusing to hold
interference with transportation within the statute, went in the direction
of the latter alternative. The quesion now remaining is how far in that
direction the Court will go.

3.
It has been seen how the Court in the Apex case developed a
restrictive interpretation of the Sherman Act to exclude from its application labor conspiracies to stop production and to stop transportation,
at least where an ultimate object is not the suppression of competition.
This development, though accomplished without disapproval of any
of the earlier cases, makes their authority precarious. The groundwork
has been laid for overruling the Danbury Hatters case,32 the Duplex
case,38 the Bedford Stone case,34 and even the Second Coronado case.85
The boycott cases, which include the first three, involved situations
little different from that of the Apex case 36 except that union interference occurred at the market stage of interstate commerce. If the
Sherman Act is now to be applied only to labor conspiracies in restraint
of competition, there can be no distinction, on the basis of effect upon
competition, between obstructions of commerce at different stages. If
See supra, at note 10.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ct. 301 (1908).
38 Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921).
34 Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Assn., 274 U. S. 37,
47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).
85 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551
(1925).
36 The union in each case was seeking to unionize the petitioner's plant, and the
only effect on interstate commerce which was shown was a reduction in the petitioner's
business.
31

32
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a boycott case comes before the Court, and the only union object is
similar to that in the Apex case, there is every reason to expect a holding like that in the Apex case.87
The Second Coronado case did involve an element relied upon to
find a violation of the Sherman Act which was not present in the Apex
case, namely a purpose on the part of the union to prevent competition
with union-produced goods in the interstate market. 88 The Court in the
latter case asserted it was not ready to discard its holding in the former,
and yet the following language appears in its opinion:
"Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers
to compel employers to yield to their demands, may restrict to
some extent the power of employers who are parties to the dispute
to compete in the market with those not subject to such demands.
But under the doctrine applied to non-labor cases, the mere fact
of such restrictions on competition does not itself bring the parties
to the agreement within the condemnation of the Sherman Act .
. . . Furthermore, successful union activity, as for example consummation of a wage agreement with employers, may have some
influence on price competition by eliminating that part of such
competition which is based on differences in labor standards. Since,
in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate
competition from non-union made goods . . . an elimination of
price competition based on differences in labor standards is the
objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on
competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment
of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act." 39
Because this language was so unnecessary to the decision rendered, 40
being even inconsistent with express reservations imposed upon the scope
of the decision, 41 and because of the effort made to cite authority, how37The holding may be made in United States v. Hutcheson, {D. C. Mo. 1940)
32 F. Supp. 600, which is before the Supreme Court this term. 8 U.S. LAw WEEK
726, 730 (1940). In that case a union involved in a jurisdictional dispute sent out
circulars through the country requesting union sympathizers to refrain from drinking
the products of a St. Louis brewery. The district court, while treating the activity
as one within the Sherman Act, proceeded upon the doubtful ground that the NorrisLaGuardia Act had made it legal.
38
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 at 310, 45 S. Ct.
551 (1925).
39
Apex case, 310 U. S. 469 at 503-504.
0
" The irrelevancy of the statements is conceded by the Court in the sentence
immediately following them: "And in any case, the restraint here is, as we have seen,
of a different kind and has not been shown to have any actual or intended effect on
price or price competition."
41
Apex case, 310 U.S. 469 at 512: "We only hold now, as we have previously

470
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ever weak,42 for the statements, one is tempted to regard this dictum
as highly significant. At least, it suggests the way the Court may go,
when a situation like that of the Second Coronado case again comes
before it.
On the basis of all the implications in the Apex decision developed
by the present analysis, labor unions should be practically exempt from
the act. Curtailment of the quantity of goods moving in interstate commerce through restraints imposed by a labor union either at the production end, at the transportation stage, or at the market end will not
of itself constitute a violation of the Sherman Act, if the Court adheres
to a restrictive interpretation of the Sherman Act. Neither will a union
purpose to eliminate price competition between union and non-union
made goods bring its activities within the act, if the Court follows its
dictum in the Apex case. With all these exemptions hardly a situation
can be conceived where labor unions would run afoul of the Sherman
Act, unless the unions are used by combinations of those engaged in an
industry as the means for suppressing competition or .fixing prices.43
Philip W. Buchen
held both in labor and non-labor cases, that such restraints are not within the Sherman
Act unless they are intended to have, or in fact have, the effects on the market on
which the Court relied to establish violation in the Second Coronado case." It is
possible to reconcile this statement with the dictum earlier in the opinion approving a
union purpose to eliminate price competition based upon differences in labor standards.
The purpose of the union in the Second Coronado case apparently went to the lengths
of wanting by destruction of the plaintiff's mines to eliminate coal entirely from competition in lieu of eliminating price competition by maintenance of its wage scale.
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 at 308, 45 S. Ct. 551
(1925). However, the distinction between a labor combination to restrain commerce
for the purpose of obtaining wage demands and one to restrain commerce because the
wage demands are not met is such that the slightest care by a union in formulating its
objectives would take it out of the doctrine of the Second Coronado case as limited by
the Court's present dictum.
42 Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 53 S. Ct. 471 (1933), held
that producers of bituminous coal did not violate the Sherman Act by creating an
exclusive selling agency to alleviate distress caused by over-production and injurious
marketing practices. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,
257 U. S. 184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921), raised no question under the Sherman Act
but merely involved a suit in general equity jurisdiction to enjoin picketing by an
outside union, the Court approving the right of a union to extend its organization but
disapproving of the methods used. In LeYering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 289 U. S.
I03, 53 S. Ct. 549 (1933), and National Association of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United
States, 263 U. S. 403, 44 S. Ct. 148 (1923), elimination of price competition in
interstate commerce is dealt with nowhere in the opinions.
43 Situations represented by United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549, 47 S. Ct. 169
(1926), and Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
291 U. S. 293, 54 S. Ct. 396 (1934).

